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Abstract
Street vice (anonymous prostitution, gambling, and the sale of illicit drugs) is spatially
concentrated, conned largely to black neighborhoods in central cities, even though demand
is quite evenly distributed throughout the general population. We show how this pattern can
arise through the interacting location decisions of sellers, buyers, and non-user households.
Areas with high demand density (cities) have lower prices and more tightly packed sellers in
equilibrium relative to areas with lower demand density (suburbs) under autarky. When trade
between city and suburb is possible, competitive pressure from the city lowers suburban prices
and seller density. Higher income households distance themselves from street vice, causing the
exposed population to become poorer and disproportionately black. Even mild preferences over
neighborhood racial composition can then induce lower income whites to exit, resulting in racial
segregation. The relationship between segregation and exposure to vice can be non-monotonic
and discontinuous: decreased segregation implies greater sorting by income, and hence larger
wage disparities between city and suburb. If such disparities get too large, all sales can shift
discontinuously to the city and result in higher overall black exposure even though more blacks
now reside in the suburbs.
This material is based upon work supported by the Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute and
the Richard B. Fisher Membership at the Institute for Advanced Study.
yDepartment of Economics, Columbia University (bo2@columbia.edu).
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1 Introduction
The extreme geographic concentration of street vice (anonymous prostitution, gambling, and the
sale of illicit drugs) has been documented for over a century. In the United States, such activities are
largely conned to neighborhoods that are centrally located and densely populated, with residents
who have poor mobility, low reservation wages and are predominantly black. What makes this
concentration remarkable is that demand for the goods and services traded in these markets is
quite evenly spread by income and race throughout the general population.1 Hence an elaborate
pattern of trade exists in most metropolitan areas, with buyers converging from far-ung locations
to the areas where sellers congregate.
This paper is an attempt to account for these patterns of location and trade. Any reasonably
complete explanation must take into account not only the location decisions of sellers but also
those of their customers and of households who are not directly involved in such transactions
but may su¤er in various ways from proximity to them. The correlation between neighborhood
characteristics and the prevalence of street vice arises both because the characteristics attract
sellers, and because the presence of sellers leads to changes in neighborhood demographics. It is
this interaction that we explore, with particular emphasis on the racial dimension of sorting.
The logic underlying our analysis may be summarized as follows. Sellers in illegal vice markets
tend to have high xed costs, including scale-independent costs of protection, and therefore produce
under increasing returns. Buyers have signicant transportation costs, arising in part from with-
drawal symptoms, risk of arrest, and the need to carry large amounts of cash or contraband. With
free entry and exit of rms, areas with high demand density (central cities) have lower prices and
more tightly packed sellers in equilibrium relative to areas with lower demand density (suburbs)
under autarky. When trade between city and suburb is possible, competitive pressure from the city
lowers suburban prices but also lowers the density of sellers. If this pressure becomes su¢ ciently
strong, suburban sales are no longer viable at any price and all transactions move (discontinuously)
to the city.
Disparities in exposure between city and suburb a¤ect location decisions of (user and non-user)
households. The user population displaces non-users in central city neighborhoods, which results
in even greater demand density, lower prices, and increased seller concentration there. Higher
income households distance themselves from street vice, causing the exposed population to become
poorer and disproportionately black. Even mild preferences over neighborhood racial composition
can then induce lower income whites to exit, resulting in extreme levels of racial segregation. The
relationship between segregation and exposure is quite complex, and can be non-monotonic and
discontinuous. Decreased racial segregation (due, for instance, to more integrationist preferences)
implies greater sorting by income, and hence larger wage disparities between city and suburb. If
such disparities get too large, all sales can shift discontinuously to the city and result in higher
overall black exposure even though more blacks now reside in the suburbs. Wilson (1987, 1996)
and other sociologists have perceived a deterioration in the quality of life in African-American
neighborhoods accompanying increased integration since the 1960s. Our model thus provides an
alternative explanation for this phenomenon.
By street vice, we mean illegal commercial transactions involving a willing seller and a willing
1See Section 2 for evidence supporting these claims.
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buyer, where the seller deals with many buyers, but has ongoing relationships with few of them,
and where buyer and seller must come together in close physical proximity.2 Thus, for instance,
we exclude internet pornography and pornography delivered through the mail as well as high-end
call-girl operations that serve a carefully maintained list of trusted customers. We also exclude
individuals who sell drugs to their friends, even if they have a large number of friends (and friends
of friends). Sellers of street vice see their customers, but they dont know or trust them. Drug
dealers and prostitutes who stand on street corners or in door fronts or even in vacant buildings
and transact business with customers they do not know are engaged in street vice; so are numbers
runners and operators of illicit but well-known gambling houses and most cock-ghting, dog-ghting
and drag-racing entrepreneurs.3
The concentration of street vice in black neighborhoods has major welfare consequences for
at least three reasons. First, there are direct e¤ects on the surrounding community. Ludwig and
Kling (2006), for instance, nd that the best predictor for whether boys in the MTO experiment
committed crimes was the presence of visible drug dealing in their neighborhoods. Second, the
high visibility of street vice results in a greater likelihood of arrest and conviction relative to more
clandestine criminal activities, exacerbating racial disparities in arrest and conviction rates (Human
Rights Watch 2008, King 2008). And third, there are reasons to believe that street vice is implicated
in the signicant racial disparities in homicide rates. Grogger and Willis (2000), Cork (1999) and
Fryer et al. (2005) all argue that drug dealing, in the form of crack cocaine, explained most of the
late 1980s spike in homicide among African-Americans.4
Starting with location theory may also help us to understand some puzzling results about
cross-metropolitan di¤erences in young adult outcomes. Cutler and Glaeser (2000) found that
young African-American adults in more segregated metropolitan areas had worse education, labor
market, and marriage outcomes, with segregation measured as the index of dissimilarity. Echenique
and Fryer (2007) note that these results are sensitive to the manner in which segregation is mea-
sured, and Ellen (2000) observes that centralization has a larger e¤ect than segregation when
low-birthweight is used as the dependent variable. The importance of centralization (relative to
segregation) is consistent with the predictions of our model.
The relationship between crime and segregation has previously been explored in theoretical
papers by Verdier and Zenou (2004) and OFlaherty and Sethi (2007). Verdier and Zenou show
that employer stereotypes of high criminality among blacks can be self-fullling, resulting in lower
wages, diminished incentives to locate near jobs, and residential segregation. Stereotypes also play
a role in OFlaherty and Sethi (2007), but in this case it is the beliefs of robbers that whites are
more compliant victims that results in higher victimization rates for whites, causing them to move
to safer neighborhoods even as otherwise identical black households remain in areas with high
crime. The present paper, in contrast, explores a very di¤erent process of sorting. Preferences over
neighborhood racial composition play a central role in household location decisions, as in Schelling
2 In the case of coerced prostitution, the pimp may be thought of as the willing seller.
3The term vice implies a violation of community standards hence the illegality of these activities. We take no
position on the issues of morality or illegality here.
4Homicide is driven in part by preemptive concerns, which implies that those who are feared are also more likely
to be killed, and those who are in fear are also more likely to kill. Since the marginal penalty for murder is smaller
for those who are already engaged in drug dealing, they are more likely to kill and hence also more likely to be killed
preemptively (OFlaherty and Sethi, 2008).
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(1971), while providers of street vice choose locations on a one dimensional space, as in Hotelling
(1929). We draw, in particular, on the location model of Salop (1979) and the segregation model
of Sethi and Somanathan (2004).5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey some of the historical and statistical
evidence that motivates our analysis. Drug selling is now the most signicant component of street
vice, and some key features of illicit drug markets are identied in Section 3. Section 4 introduces
the model, and the cases of autarky and trade are analyzed in Sections 5-6 respectively, while
holding constant the distribution across space of households. Residential mobility is introduced in
Section 7, and the link between segregation and exposure is explored in Section 8. The location
decisions of drug users are endogenized in Section 9. Some empirical implications of the model are
discussed in Section 10 and Section 11 concludes.
2 Evidence
2.1 History
Writing in 1915, Booker T. Washington (pp. 113-14) described the concentration of street vice in
black neighborhoods as follows:
A segregated Negro community is a terrible temptation to many White people. Such
a community invariably provides certain types of White men with hiding-places... from
decent people of their own race, from their churches and their wives and daughters... In
New Orleans the legalized vice section is set in the midst of the Negro section, and near
the spot where stood a Negro school and a Negro church, and near the place where the
Negro orphanage now operates. Now when a Negro seeks to buy a house in a reputable
street he does it not only to get police protection, lights and accommodations, but also
to remove his children to a locality in which vice is not paraded.
Three decades later, Myrdal (1944, p.977) described a similar pattern:
Negro neighborhoods are frequented by whites who wish to do something illicit or im-
moral... White men come to Negro neighborhoods to nd both white and Negro prosti-
tutes. Gambling dens and cabarets (during the Prohibition era, elaborate speakeasies)
are often concentrated in Negro neighborhoods... Illegal selling of narcotics is much
simpler in Negro neighborhoods...Much of the crime and vice in cities, and sometimes
even in smaller towns, exists because the white man brings his own crime, vice and
disrespect for law to Negroes.
Long before the War on Drugs and the evolution of contemporary anonymous drug markets, it
appears that street vice, especially gambling, was concentrated in African American neighborhoods.
5Our work is also loosely related to recent theoretical models of urban squatting (Brueckner and Selod, 2008;
Turnbull, 2008) since purveyors of street vice, like squatters, use space to which they have no formal claim.
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The role of the numbers game may have been especially important. This form of gambling has
largely been supplanted in most states by the daily lottery, which was modeled on it. In this game,
large numbers of people every day (twice a day in Chicago) place small amounts of money on
particular numbers; a winning number is chosen every day and holders of that number and various
permutations of it receive immediate payouts. It was called numberson the East Coast, where
the winning number was usually the last three digits of the daily Treasury balance, and policy
in the Midwest, where the winning number was generally produced by a mechanical randomization
device. Policy was big business. In the rst half of 1935, 31.9% of male arrests in Harlem were
for policy gambling (E. Franklin Frazier in a study for the Mayors Commission on Conditions in
Harlem, cited by Myrdal, p. 974). Drake and Cayton (1945, 1962), in their famous study of the
south side of Chicago, devote an entire chapter to this business, which they estimate employed
about 5000 people at the end of the depression (p. 481).
2.2 Arrest and Conviction Records
Arrests and convictions are not a random sample of people who engage in vice crimes; the sample
is weighted heavily toward the most visible and risky (in terms of arrest) forms of vice. Street vice
results in more arrests than clandestine vice for several reasons. First, neighbors are more likely to
complain about it. Second, arresting street dealers is easier than arresting clandestine dealers, since
street dealers will often fall victim to simple buy-and-bust operations while arresting clandestine
dealers usually requires sophisticated and time-consuming inltration e¤orts. To the extent that
police are motivated either by complaints or by a desire to show large numbers of arrests, they will
target street dealers (Stinchcombe, 1963; Goode 2002).
Surveys of drug use suggest that clandestine vice (which is much less likely to result in arrest)
is a signicant component of overall engagement in vice crimes. For instance, of those who used
marijuana in 2006, only 43% bought it (most got it free or shared someone elses), and of those
who bought it, only 16% bought it from someone they had just met or did not know well; the vast
majority bought from friends (SAMHSA 2008, tables 7.41B, 7.40B). Along similar lines, Beckett
(2004) estimated that in Seattle only 30% of meth users, 48% of powder cocaine users, 61% of
heroin users, and 63% of crack cocaine users last purchased it outdoors. Hence a large proportion
of users do not deal directly with sellers of street vice, and these clandestine transactions are not
adequately captured by arrest and conviction records.
With this in mind, the records suggest that blacks have been disproportionately involved in
the more dangerous, visible parts of the sale of anonymous vice for decades. Arrest data for 1940
(Uniform Crime Reports, 1940, cited in Myrdal, 1944, p. 973) indicates that blacks accounted for
22.8% of overall arrests in the US in that year. The crimes for which blacks represented the highest
percentage of arrestees were liquor laws, 47.2% (distinct from drunkenness and DWI), weapons
carrying (45.8%), assault (44.0%), gambling (41.9%), and criminal homicide (40.1%).
Similar patterns prevail today. On arrests, blacks are hugely disproportionately likely to be
arrested for gambling: 71.8% of those arrested on gambling charges in 2006 were black (Sourcebook,
table 4.10). While the proportion black among arrestees for prostitution (39.6%) and drug abuse
violations (35.1%) were lower than the proportions for gambling and murder, they were still higher
than the proportion of blacks among arrestees for all index crimes except robbery.
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Arrest data, however, are ambiguous on whether arrestees were consumers or producers of vice;
the latter is our primary concern. This ambiguity is a major concern with drug arrests, since 82%
of drug arrests are for possession (Sourcebook, table 4.29), and many people arrested for possession
are consumers. Data on felony convictions in state courts resolve some of the ambiguity. These
are broken out by tra¢ cking and possession: 47% of those convicted of drug tra¢ cking o¤enses in
2004 were black, as were 44% of those convicted of drug possession (Sourcebook, table 5.45.2004).
These proportions were higher than for any other category of crime except murder and robbery.
The disproportionate toll of drug arrests and incarcerations on the black community, especially
since the start of the War on Drugs, has been well-documented (see, for instance, Human Rights
Watch 2008, King 2008, Loury 2007). In 34 large US cities for which reasonably good data were
available in 2003, 2221 blacks were arrested for drug law violations per 100,000 population, as
opposed to 657 whites (King 2008). These arrests are also concentrated in central cities. Although
only 42% of New York States population lives in New York City, 81% of the states drug arrests
are made in the city. Blacks in New York City account for 10.7% of state population, but 42.1%
of state drug arrests (King 2008). Similar results hold for state prison admissions. In 34 states for
which good data were available in 2003, blacks were admitted to prison for drug o¤enses at a rate
of 256.2 per 100,000 adult residents, whites at a rate of 25.3 per 100,000 adults (Human Rights
Watch 2008).
Many reasons have been given for this disparity, including racist behavior, conscious or uncon-
scious, in the drafting and enforcement of drug laws. Almost all commentators, however, believe
that one factor in the disparity is that drugs are sold more openly in black neighborhoods than
in white, in keeping with our description of street vice (Tonry 1995, Human Rights Watch 2000,
MacDonald 2008, Sentencing Project 2008).6 Hagedorn (1998), for instance, in a study of drug-
selling in Milwaukee, found ourishing street drug rms in minority neighborhoods, with customers
mainly drawn from outside the neighborhood, and a large percentage of white customers (p. 74).
One remarkable aspect of the white youth and suburban drug market is that, unlike the inner
city, drug sales are not neighborhood-based. Try as we could, we could not locate any suburban
or white, alternative culture neighborhoods that resemble inner-city drug markets like [the two
minority neighborhoods]. . . Suburban drug selling has not changed much over the years: it still is
basically a word-of-mouthoperation.(pp. 14-19). By contrast, Beckett et al. (2004) describe an
open-air heroin market with white sellers in Seattle, but this is perfectly consistent with our model.
Indeed, in a situation with a large white population living at fairly high density and a small black
population, one would expect to see street vice in white neighborhoods. We have been unable to
locate any ethnographic reports of black customers traveling to white neighborhoods to purchase
drugs.
2.3 Drug Demand
Non-Hispanic blacks use illicit drugs somewhat more frequently than non-Hispanic whites do, and
non-Hispanic whites use drugs more frequently than Hispanics do, but the di¤erences, while statis-
tically signicant, are small. Table 1 provides details (SAMHSA, 2008, tables 1.19B and 1.19D).
6Beckett (2004) and Beckett, Nyrop and Pingst (2006) argue that in Seattle open-air sales are not the major
factor in the disparity, but concede that they are still a factor.
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Di¤erences in drug use by race and ethnicity are clearly far too small to account for the disparities
in arrest and conviction rates. The only major di¤erence arises in the case of crack cocaine, but this
is a very small component of overall illicit drug use. In the case of powder cocaine, non-Hispanic
whites had a higher rate of use than non-Hispanic blacks in 2006, and the overall incidence of
cocaine use (powder and crack combined) was virtually identical.
Table 1. Percentage over 12 who had used illicit drugs in the past month.
White Black Hispanic
Illicit Drugs 8:3 9:8 6:9
Marijuana 6:4 7:4 4:1
Powder Cocaine 0:9 0:3 1:4
Crack Cocaine 0:2 0:8 0:3
Source: 2006 National Household Survey of Drug Use and Health
3 Features of Illicit Drug Markets
We draw on several features of illicit drug markets to motivate our modeling assumptions. Many
(but not all) of these apply more generally to markets for anonymous vice. In an earlier era (for
instance, during the ascendancy of the numbers game as described in Drake and Cayton), we might
use language about some other form of street vice but in keeping with the current situation, we
concentrate on illicit drugs.
First, customers have high transportation cost. On trips to the market, many will be experienc-
ing or fearing withdrawal symptoms, and will otherwise be desperate and anxious. Time searching
for a sofa to buy is usually more pleasant than time searching for heroin to buy. On return trips
with drugs, customers will be subject to arrest by police and drug conscation; they may also be
preyed upon by free-lance robbers. Because home storage of drugs is dangerous, users will make
frequent trips. Poor users, moreover, may rely on public transportation, but cannot conne their
trips to rush hours when service is frequent.
Second, drug sellers have high xed costs. Because their activities are illegal, they have a high
cost of protection regardless of their scale, since they must employ some means of fending o¤ both
authorities and those rivals who would disrupt their business or steal their cash and inventory.
If rms did not have high xed costs, high transportation costs for customers would imply that
many small rms would spread evenly throughout the metropolitan area to accommodate customers
directly. Every neighborhood would have a convenient drug dealer, just as every neighborhood now
has a convenient place to pick up a lottery ticket or a quart of milk.
Third, demand almost everywhere is quite thin. Less than 12% of gross domestic product is
spent on illicit drugs, and well over 95% of the population never buys them. Because demand is
thin relative to xed costs, not every neighborhood can support its own free-standing drug dealer.
Fourth, drug dealing rms specialize; you generally cannot sell illicit drugs along with brooms,
furniture, milk, shoes, and birthday cards. This is because drug dealing is illegal: by selling drugs
you put your birthday card inventory at risk of being conscated or stolen, and so you will not be
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the lowest-cost seller of birthday cards. Thus illicit drug dealers cannot imitate CVS or Walmart
and spread their high xed costs over many products, each of which individually has thin demand.
Fifth, drug dealing uses unskilled labor intensively. Selling itself requires little more than
inventory and unskilled youths, and the xed costs of protection are also provided primarily by
hoodlums who have few other marketable skills. All wages must be augmented by a premium
to o¤set the risk of imprisonment, but that premium depends on the reservation wage of labor.
Studies of street-level drug selling having found that many people engage in it for short periods
of time, often while they have other jobs or commitments (Reuter and MacCoun 1992, Reuter,
MacCoun and Murphy 1990, Levitt and Venkatesh 2000). There is also a consensus that drug
dealing pays better than the wages its workers could otherwise command, but disagreement on the
size of the premium and whether it is reasonable compensation for the risks involved. Ethnographic
studies (Bourgois 1995) and studies using business records (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000) nd smaller
premiums than studies that rely on self-reports (Fagan 1992, Reuter and MacCoun 1992). Caulkins
et al. (1999) emphasize the heterogeneity of jobs and rm organization in this market, and this
heterogeneity may explain the di¤ering ndings.
Sixth, workers in this industry usually do not make long journeys to work from their homes. To
the extent that they must carry drugs or money before or after work, long journeys are dangerous.
Those selling drugs on street corners cannot lock up their inventory and money in a handy safe
when the time comes to go home. Even for those workers without these responsibilities, being
local has great advantages, since knowledge of a neighborhoods idiosyncrasies, both geographic
and human, can be crucial for handling law enforcement, robbers, and rivals.
Finally, street dealers dont pay for the space they use. Therefore they do not have to outbid
competing users, and can operate at their ideal locations. The price of land does not enter their
calculus (although drug dealing manifestly can a¤ect the price of land). They do, however, have to
make defensive expenditures to maintain their use of the land, as in Brueckner and Selod (2008);
we model these expenditures explicitly.
These seven features of illicit drug markets generally imply that drug dealing will be concen-
trated in centralized, low-wage neighborhoods, although the degree of concentration depends on
many specic parameters. These intuitions, however, do not account for the possibility of consumer
(and non-user) mobility. If drug consumers were fully mobile, and cared about nothing else, they
would all live in the same place, and drug dealing would be incredibly concentrated, but it would
not necessarily be centralized. The drug community would locate where wage costs were lowest.
Similarly, if non-users were indi¤erent to the presence of drug dealers the demographic character-
istics of the population exposed to street vice would not necessarily di¤er greatly from those of the
population at large.
Neither of these is the case. Drug-selling causes many kinds of indirect harm in the neighbor-
hoods where it occurs: teenagers are more likely to engage in non-drug crime of all sorts, to drop
out of school, to eschew the legal workplace and the behaviors it rewards; older people are more
likely to be endangered when they use the streets; legitimate businesses have di¢ culty protecting
their inventory and customers; parks and open spaces become dirty, dangerous, and uninviting.
Most residents will therefore seek out other places to live, and those who remain will be the ones
who are least willing and able to pay the higher rents that characterize safer and more appealing
environments.
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Responding to these signicant disamenities, the most a­ uent non-user households will tend to
leave neighborhoods where drug dealing starts to be openly paraded, and the exposed population
will therefore be of lower income. Racial disparities in the metropolitan distribution of income
then imply that the exposed population will have a higher share of black households than the
population at large. This in turn induces whites to outbid blacks of equal a­ uence for housing
in safer neighborhoods, even if preferences over neighborhood racial composition are moderately
pro-integrationist and reect a taste for diversity. The result is even greater segregation by race
than sorting based on income alone would predict. Similar e¤ects arise in the user population:
black users are more likely to reside in neighborhoods with extensive street vice than white users
of similar income.
There are other factors which induce whites to leave even as blacks in the same income class
remain. Market sorting ensures that those who remain will be less averse to the disamenities
drug dealing creates. In particular, ceteris paribus, they are the people who would feel safest in
such a dangerous neighborhood. White people are less likely to feel safe in a black, drug-dealing
neighborhood for a variety of reasons: because they are likely to be stereotyped as drug consumers
(correctly, since a higher proportion of whites than of blacks seen in these neighborhoods are
buying drugs), because they are likely to be stereotyped as non-resistant, possibly because they are
stereotyped as rich, and because they are likely to be stereotyped as having few relatives or close
friends in the neighborhood to avenge crimes against them. Simple prejudice may also be operative.
Since whites will not outbid blacks to live in these neighborhoods, they will remain predominantly
black, despite the disamenities.
Indeed, the long-run residential dynamics of drug-dealing neighborhoods are stable. Drug con-
sumers move in, African Americans of various income levels and the poorest of whites remain, and
all others move out. The more poor people, the lower the wage that drug-dealing rms have to
pay. And the greater the demand density, the lower the equilibrium price and inter-seller distance.
These dynamics are explored more fully below.
4 The Model
We model a metropolitan area as two concentric circles (city and suburb), with the city having cir-
cumference Lc and the suburb circumference Ls > Lc: Total demand for drugs per unit population
is assumed to be price inelastic.7 The demand per unit distance in neighborhood (city or suburb)
i 2 fc; sg is denoted i; and we assume that c > s (demand density is greater in the city than
in the suburb). Note that this does not require that per-capita demand is greater in the city; it
is enough that the city have greater population density. The condition c > s would hold even if
both city and suburban residents consume drugs at the same rate, simply because the former live in
closer proximity to each other. Greater population density in central neighborhoods is a standard
theoretical result in urban economics that has considerable empirical support (see, for instance,
Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993).
All travel is along the circumference of the circle on which an individual resides, except possibly
7 Inelastic demand, at least up to some high choke point, is the usual assumption in spatial competition models
(Hotelling 1929, Salop 1979). In addition, Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2005) conclude that substantial evidence
supports the proposition that illicit drug demand is inelastic.
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for some travel between circles, which we introduce in Section 6. Within ones neighborhood
consumers have (linear) travel cost per unit of distance of t. (We assume for simplicity that this is
the same in both locations, although all results continue to hold as long as the travel cost per unit
distance in the city and suburb are not too di¤erent.)
Consumers minimize the total cost of acquiring drugs, which is simply the sum of travel cost
and the price paid. Let jy1; y2j denote the distance between points y1 and y2 on the same circle
i. Then a consumer at point y, confronted by a set of rms with prices pj and locations yj , will
purchase drugs from rm j where
j = argmin
j
pj + t jy; yj j ;
and will be indi¤erent about purchasing from a set of rms that minimize this expression.
Drug entrepreneurs make three decisions: whether to operate, where to operate, and what price
to charge. To operate their businesses in neighborhood i 2 fc; sg, they must pay a xed cost C,
and hire one unit of labor at wage wi per unit of drugs sold.8 The xed cost includes defensive
payments, as used in Brueckner and Selod (2008), and the wage wi includes the wholesale price of
drugs. Following Salop (1979), all rms who decide to enter a neighborhood are assigned locations
on the circle equidistant from each other. We are more interested in the division of business between
neighborhoods than in the exact location of rms within neighborhoods.
There are a large number of potential rms. We model their interdependent decision-making
as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, each rm decides whether to enter, and if it enters, which
neighborhood to locate in. In the second stage rms set prices. We look for subgame perfect
equilibria of this two-stage game. Since there are many identical potential rms and many identical
locations, in equilibrium all rms that enter will make zero prot (we ignore the constraint that
the number of rms be an integer). This approach is standard in Salop (1979) and the ensuing
literature.
A rm charges the same price to all its customers. Labor is supplied perfectly elastically at the
going wage wi in each neighborhood i. At that wage, a rm can hire as many workers as it wants
from the exact location of its business (workers do not commute). The assumption of perfect local
supply elasticity reects the fact that drug-selling requires few specic skills, and that it is a small
industry.
5 Autarky
We assume rst that travel between the two neighborhoods is impossible; this assumption is relaxed
in the next section. In this case we can nd the equilibrium on each circle separately. The solution





8As in the case of the travel cost t; we assume for notational simplicity that the xed cost is independent of
location. All our results continue to hold with heterogeneous xed costs as long as xed costs are lower in whichever
location has lower wages. This is plausible, since a major component of xed costs involves the hiring of unskilled
labor for protection. The costs of protection tend to be lower in less a­ uent areas both because the market wage is
lower, and because authorities are less steadfast in their opposition to street vice.
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Suppose that ni rms enter neighborhood i in the rst stage, and are located at a distance i = Li=ni
from their nearest neighbors. Consider a rm that charges a price q when all other rms charge
p: The marginal consumer (indi¤erent between this rm and its neighbor) will be at a distance s





The rms prot is then







The rst order condition is (after simplication)
2q = p+ ti + wi:
At a symmetric Nash equilibrium q = p so
pi = ti + wi: (2)
The number of rms entering at the rst stage is determined by the zero prot condition, with full
anticipation of second stage prices:
(pi   wi) ii   C = 0:









From (2), the price charged in neighborhood i can be expressed in terms of the primitives of the
model as follows:
pi = wi + t
p
Ai: (5)
Suppose for the moment that wages are identical across neighborhoods. Then, since c > s;
we have Ac < As and hence pc < ps: Drug prices will be lower in the city than in the suburb
because demand density is greater, promotes more competition and allows xed costs to be spread
over a large base without requiring large travel costs. Furthermore, we have c < s; so rms will
be located closer to each other in the city. This is because greater density allows more demand to
be generated in a small space. We cannot say whether there are more rms in the city than in the
suburb, because the geographic expanse of the suburb is greater.
This basic conclusion (lower prices and shorter distance between rms) is further strengthened
if wages are lower in the city than in the suburb. This follows immediately from (13), and we
state the result for future reference as
Proposition 1. If wc  ws then pc < ps and c < s:
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Wages may be lower in the city if less a­ uent households live there, which itself could be an
equilibrium response to higher levels of drug-selling activity. We argue below that the conditions
under which Proposition 1 holds will be satised even when location choices of users and non-user
households are fully endogenous.









Thus, in autarky, although drug rms are easier to nd in cities, city residents are not dispropor-
tionately employed in the industry.
6 Trade
Since prices in the city are lower in autarky, and drug rms are easier to nd, there is scope for
trade. In this section we examine trade driven by price di¤erences, and in the next section we add
household mobility. Since city residents have no reason to go to the suburbs to buy drugs, we look
only at whether suburban consumers will buy drugs in the city.
We assume a simple technology for inter-neighborhood trade. A suburban consumer who wants
to buy drugs in the city must pay a (round-trip) cost  which delivers him from his home location
to a randomly selected location in the city.9 Once in the city, the consumer behaves exactly as
a city resident would, paying additional travel costs to reach a rm, and selecting the rm which
minimizes total cost (inclusive of travel). Given any symmetric equilibrium in which the city price
is pc and the inter-rm distance in the city is c; the expected cost of drugs to suburban consumers
who buy in the city is simply




This serves as a reservation price for suburban consumers. Note that under autarky, using (5) and
(3), we have






Three distinct classes of equilibria can arise when trade is possible. When  is su¢ ciently large,
the autarky equilibrium is replicated and there is no e¤ect on prices or the number of rms in
either neighborhood. For somewhat smaller values of  ; the possibility of trade exerts competitive
pressure on suburban sellers, who are forced to lower prices in order to retain their customers. Lower
suburban prices result in the exit of some rms, so inter-rm distance in the suburb increases. There
is no e¤ect on prices of the number of rms in the city, and no trade actually occurs. Finally, if
 is su¢ ciently small, there exists an equilibrium in which all suburban consumers buy from city
rms, prices in the city fall, and entry raises the number of sellers in the city. The latter two types
of equilibria can coexist, and indeed must do so for certain values of  : Stated formally, we have:
9The value of  reects time as well as the dangers that might be perceived from travelling in a strange neigh-
borhood on an illegal mission with considerable money. On the other hand, as Booker T. Washington pointed out,
leaving ones home neighborhood to shop for drugs has some advantages, which may mitigate some of these costs.
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Proposition 2. There exist thresholds  l; m; and h such that  l < minfm; hg and (i) if
 > h there is an equilibrium with no trade and no impact on prices or seller density relative to
autarky, (ii) if  l <  < h there is an equilibrium with no trade in which the suburban price and
seller density are both lower relative to autarky, and (iii) if  < m there is an equilibrium in which












































Figure 1. Geographic distribution of rms in the three regimes.
The number and spatial distribution of rms in each of the three regimes are shown in Figure
1 for a particular specication of the model.10 As the cost to suburban residents of purchases in
the city decline from a high level, the initial e¤ect is to lower the number of suburban rms and
increase the distance between them. This transition is continuous. Eventually a point is reached
when suburban sales can no longer be supported, and there is a discontinuous transition to the
agglomeration regime, with a sharp rise in the number of rms in the city. The changes in the
suburban drug price corresponding to this transition are shown in Figure 2 (the transitions occur
as one moves from right to left). Note that the transition to a centralized structure can occur at
any value of  between m and  l; consistent with the fact that there are multiple equilibria in this
range.11
When  lies in the range  l    h; lower values of  correspond to lower suburban drug
prices, fewer suburban rms, and greater distance between rms. Intuitively, competition from the
city forces suburban rms to cut prices; lower prices put some rms out of business; fewer rms
mean greater distances between rms. All suburban consumers continue to buy in the suburbs:
the marginal consumer faces greater transportation costs since rms are harder to nd, but these
costs are exactly o¤set by lower prices. In this regime, the most visible di¤erence between city and
10The gure is based on the following parameters: Ls = 12; Lc = 3; s = 1; c = 9; Fs = Fc = 1; ts = tc = 1;
and ws = wc = 1: The number and neighborhood location of rms in each of the three equilibria shown are
(ns; nc) = (12; 9) in the rst regime, (ns; nc) = (9; 9) in the second, and (ns; nc) = (0; 11) in the third.
11Note also that it is theoretically possible for m to exceed h; in which case multiple equilibria will arise even
when  > h: For this to occur, aggregate suburban demand must be su¢ ciently large relative to the internal demand
in the city.
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suburb that we found in autarky is magnied. Drug rms are even further apart in the suburb than
they were in autarky, but they are just as close together in the city. For strong enough competition,
this process can unravel: price cutting leads to fewer rms, which leads to less accessibility, which
leads to lower prices in order to keep customers from defecting. When this is no longer sustainable
drug-selling is completely concentrated in the city, with lower prices and higher seller density.
Figure 2. Suburban and city drug prices as a function of  :
While Figures 1-2 illustrate the e¤ects of changes in  ; the comparative advantage of the city
can also be a¤ected by changes in demand density, wages and xed costs. We show next that when
(user and non-user) households are mobile, they sort themselves across neighborhoods in such a
manner as to further increase the citys advantage, and hence stabilize allocations in which sales
are concentrated there.
7 Residential Mobility
We have assumed to this point that the populations of the city and suburb are exogenously given,
and that drug demand per capita is the same in both. If fact, there are several dimensions on
the basis of which individuals might choose their location, and these choices will be sensitive to
the geographic distribution of drug activity. First and foremost, those who are not themselves
users will prefer locations in which street drug selling is absent or rare. Second, the more a­ uent
will outbid poorer households in securing the most desirable locations. And third, when there is
racial inequality in the distribution of income, even moderate preferences over neighborhood racial
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composition can set in motion a process of segregation in residential patterns. We begin with an
exploration of sorting by income and race, and turn to the location of drug users in Section 9.
Suppose that the metropolitan population is composed of two groups, black and white, with
income distributions Fb(y) and Fw(y) respectively.12 We assume that at all income levels y;
Fb(y)  Fw(y); (8)
with strict inequality whenever Fb(y) > 0 and Fw(y) < 1: This reects the (empirically relevant)
assumption that the blacks are less a­ uent as a group than whites. A share  of the population is
black. Drug demand is evenly distributed across the income distribution and by race. We consider
the equilibrium sorting of this population across city and suburb, ignoring for the moment the fact
that drug users may di¤er from non-users in their location preferences.
Let i denote the proportion of the total population that neighborhood i can accommodate,
which we shall refer to as its capacity. Let ri denote the rent for a housing unit in neighborhood i
(or, equivalently, the constant annuity that has the same present value as the purchase price). We
normalize rc = 0 and interpret rs = r as the suburban rent premium.13
All income not spent on rent is spent on private consumption. Households care about their
level of consumption as well as the characteristics of the neighborhood in which they reside. We
focus here on two neighborhood characteristics: racial composition and seller density. A household
belonging to group j 2 fb; wg chooses a location i 2 fc; sg to maximize
u(x) + vj(i; i); (9)
where x is private consumption, i is the share of black residents in neighborhood i; and i is the
distance between sellers in neighborhood i:14 We refer to i as the inter-seller distance, and its
reciprocal as the seller density. We assume that u(x) is increasing and strictly concave and that
vj(i; i) is strictly increasing in i (and hence decreasing in seller density) for each j 2 fb; wg:
This latter assumption reects the fact that visible drug dealing is an undesirable neighborhood
characteristic. Hence if there were no rent di¤erential and the racial composition of the two neigh-
borhoods were identical, all households would prefer to live in the neighborhood with lower seller
density.
Preferences over neighborhood racial composition may be non-monotonic, reecting a taste for
diversity, but we require that any given increase in i be valued more highly by black relative to
white households. Specically, we assume that for any ; 0 satisfying 0  ; and any  and 0;
vb(
0; 0)  vb(; )  vw(0; 0)  vw(; ); (10)
12A more complete model would include rms as well as individuals. Firms have no group identity although they
may have racial preferences. Many of them are likely to have a strong aversion to the presence of street vice. This
aversion could lead to a reduction in business activity in African-American neighborhoods; such a reduction is liable
to increase the wage gap in much the same manner as household sorting on the basis of income.
13 It is important to note that r is the suburban rent premium per housing unit, and not per unit land area. Since
population density is lower in the suburb, suburban dwellings are of greater size. Hence r > 0 is consistent with a
higher price of land in the city, as long as individual housing units cost more in the suburb.
14This specication allows for the possibility (but does not require) that vb(i; i) = v
w(1   i; i); which would
correspond to symmetric preferences over neighborhood racial composition among blacks and whites.
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with strict inequality when 0 > : This is a very weak requirement, fully consistent with strong
tastes for diversity as well as the available survey evidence (Sethi and Somanathan, 2004).
Following Sethi and Somanathan (2004), we say that an allocation of households across neigh-
borhoods is intraracially stratied (IRS) if there exist income thresholds ~yb and ~yw such that all
households above the threshold for their respective group live in one neighborhood, while all those
below live in the other. Intraracially stratied allocations are consistent with a broad range of
allocations, from sorting by income alone (if ~yb = ~yw) to extreme racial segregation (if ~yj is the
highest income in the support of Fj(y) for some group j):
At any IRS allocation the capacity constraint for each neighborhood must be satised as follows
Fb(~yb) + (1  )Fw(~yw) = c: (11)
If (11) holds, then the corresponding capacity constraint for the suburb is necessarily satised.
Finally, dene the marginal bid rent rj (y) for a group j individual with income y as the solution
to
u(y) + vj(c; c) = u(y   r) + vj(s; s):
This is the individuals maximum willingness to pay to live in the suburb, and could be positive or
negative.
An equilibrium is an allocation of households across neighborhoods and a level of suburban rent
such that no household wishes to move to a di¤erent location. In any group that is represented
in both neighborhoods at an equilibrium, there must be an individual who is indi¤erent between
the two neighborhoods at the prevailing rent. Furthermore, at least one group must be present in
both neighborhoods in equilibrium, except in the (non-generic) case where the population shares
of the two groups exactly match the capacities of the two neighborhoods. Given our assumptions,
the following holds:
Proposition 3. All equilibrium allocations are intraracially stratied, and r 6= 0 in equilibrium.
Although r < 0 is theoretically possible, we focus here on the case r > 0. In this case all
households below the threshold corresponding to their respective group must reside in the city, and
we may dene an IRS equilibrium as a triple (~yb; ~yw; r) such that
u(y) + vj(c; c)  u(y   r) + vj(s; s) (12)
if and only if j = b and y  ~yb or j = w and y  ~yw.
Corresponding to any IRS allocation (~yb; ~yw) is a unique pair of racial compositions (c; s);
























We assume that neighborhood wages wc and ws are strictly increasing in the respective mean
incomes yc and ys: Hence the greater the extent of sorting by income in location choices, the
greater the wage disparity across neighborhoods.
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As a benchmark, consider the case of pure sorting by income and let i denote the share of
the black population in neighborhood i at this allocation. Let y denote the threshold (common
to both groups) above which households select the suburban location under pure income sorting.
Then an immediate consequence of (8) is
c >  > 

s: (15)
The city has a (proportionally) larger black population than the suburb under pure sorting by
income, reecting the fact that blacks are less a­ uent than whites as a group. However, as we
show below, pure sorting by income can never be an equilibrium.
Dene y^b as follows
Fb (y^b)




and let y^w denote the unique value of ~yw that solves (11) when ~yb = y^b: Then, at the allocation
(y^b; y^w); both neighborhoods have the same racial composition: c = s = : Note that y^b < y^w
from (8) and hence y^b < y < y^w; where y is the income threshold (common to both groups) at
the allocation with pure income sorting. From (15) it follows that for all allocations (~yb; ~yw) 2
[y^b; y
] [y; y^w]; we have c    s:
At any allocation (~yb; ~yw) 2 [y^b; y] [y; y^w] the marginal bid rents rj (~yj) must (by denition)
satisfy
u(~yj) + vj(c; c) = u(~yj   rj (~yj)) + vj(s; s)
for each j 2 fb; wg: We assume that the taste for diversity among whites is not so strong as to
overwhelm their distaste for proximity to drug-selling in the sense that if c < s; then
vw(c; c) < vw(s; s) (16)
for all allocations (~yb; ~yw) 2 [y^b; y] [y; y^w]: This condition ensures that the white marginal bid-
rent rw(~yw) is positive at all allocations (~yb; ~yw) 2 [y^b; y]  [y; y^w]; which in turn is su¢ cient to
guarantee existence of an equilibrium with a positive suburban rent premium. Our main result is
the following.
Proposition 4. Suppose that c < s: Then there exists an equilibrium (~yb; ~yw; r) such that r > 0;
~yb > y
 > ~yw; wc < ws; and c > 

c : There is no equilibrium with c 2 [; c ] :
This result states that if the city has greater seller density, then there exists an equilibrium in
which the proportion of black residents in the city is greater than that which would arise under
pure sorting by income. At any such equilibrium, black exposure to high seller density is greater
than could be predicted simply on the basis of racial income di¤erences. Furthermore, the city has
lower mean income (and hence lower wages) than the suburb at any such equilibrium.
Putting together Propositions 1-4, we see that higher seller density, lower wages, and a dis-
proportionate presence of black households in the city are all mutually reinforcing. Lower wages
attract sellers, sellers drive out a­ uent households who are disproportionately white, and the result-
ing change in racial composition drives out some lower income whites, further increasing the racial
imbalance between city and suburb. This pattern is further stabilized when users are themselves
mobile, as we show in Section 9. First, however, we explore the relationship between segregation
and racial disparities in exposure.
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8 Segregation and Exposure
Dene the exposure of an individual to vice as the seller density in the neighborhood in which he
resides, and the exposure of a group is the average exposure across all its members. Proposition 4
identies the existence of an equilibrium in which the black population is more exposed than would
be the case under pure sorting by income. We now explore the manner in which exposure of blacks
and whites varies with the level of equilibrium segregation, and show that this relationship can be
non-monotonic and discontinuous, with lower segregation resulting in greater black exposure.
Corresponding to any equilibrium in which c > 

c ; the threshold level of income ~yw of the
marginal white household must satisfy
yminw  ~yw < y;
where yminw satises
 + (1  )Fw(yminw ) = c:
When ~yw = yminw , all black households live in the city and segregation is at its maximal level. As
~yw approaches y; segregation declines to zero as the economy approaches pure income sorting. Let
 2 [0; 1] denote the level of integration corresponding to any equilibrium threshold ~yw, dened by
~yw = (1  ) yminw + y:
Given ~yw () ; the corresponding black threshold ~yb () > y is simply determined by the capacity
constraints for the two neighborhoods. The mean incomes in the two neighborhoods yc and ys are
given by (13-14) and may also be expressed as functions of . Note that yc() is decreasing: greater
integration implies more income sorting and lower income levels in the less a­ uent neighborhood.
For the same reason, ys() is increasing. Since neighborhood wages vary monotonically with mean
incomes, we may write wc () and ws () ; the former function is decreasing and the latter increasing.
Changes in integration therefore a¤ect income distributions and hence local wages, which in
turn a¤ect the location decisions of rms. Of particular interest is the case in which such changes
can induce a discontinuous shift in location patterns that dramatically alters racial disparities in
exposure. A su¢ cient condition for this to happen is that the autarky equilibrium is replicated
under complete segregation ( = 0); while only the agglomeration equilibrium exists under complete
integration ( = 1): The following two conditions ensure that this is the case:






















If these conditions hold, then it must be the case that exposure varies non-monotonically and
discontinuously with integration, with a sharp rise in black exposure at the point of discontinuity.
This is illustrated for a particular numerical specication of the model in Figure 3.
Hence integration, which results in greater suburban black representation, can also result in
increases in overall black exposure. This is because the suburb becomes more a­ uent relative to
the city as integration rises, and the resulting changes in local wages can cause drug sales to shift
to the city. The suburban population that benets from this is disproportionately white, while
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the population that becomes more exposed is disproportionately black. Note however, that greater





Figure 3. Segregation and Exposure
Has integration in fact exposed the average African-American to more street vice? Some work
in sociology argues that it has. In particular, Wilson (1987, 1996) contrasts the safety and civility
of pre-integration African-American neighborhoods with the criminality and disorganization he
nds in these neighborhoods after 1970 or so. He attributes this deterioration to middle class exit.
Blacks in Harlem and in other ghetto neighborhoods did not hesitate to sleep in parks, on re
escapes, and on rooftops during hot summer nights in the 1940s and 1950s, he writes, but he
nds that these neighborhoods no longer exhibit the features of social organization (1987, p.
3). Of Woodlawn in Chicago, Wilson (1996, p. 5) quotes approvingly from Loic Wacquant: The
once-lively streetsresidents remember a time, not so long ago, when crowds were so dense at rush
hour that one had to elbow ones way to the train stationnow have the appearance of an empty
bombed out war zone.
For Wilson, the process that brought about these changes is social isolationand concentra-
tion e¤ects(1987, pp. 58, 60): children have fewer role models, job-seekers have more restricted
networks, and social institutions function less e¤ectively. Our model has the same general predic-
tions, but the mechanism is di¤erent. It is also arguably more plausible for two reasons. First, it is
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more direct: street vice is what makes these neighborhoods unsafe and disorganized. Second, the
amount of residential integration that occurred during the time when neighborhoods deteriorated
is small, and the processes on which Wilson relies should require a lot of time. To consider the
two cities in Wilsons examples: the index of black-white dissimilarity for metropolitan Chicago
fell only from 91.9 in 1970 to 85.8 in 1990; for metropolitan New York the index of dissimilarity
actually rose during this period, from 81.0 in 1970 to 82.2 in 1990 (Massey and Denton, 1993, table
8.1, page 222).15 A process with discontinuities like ours seems more appropriate.
Of course, we do not pretend that our model explains all the changes that have taken place in
African-American neighborhoods in the past half century. Rising wage inequality, for instance, has
probably mattered, as has the growth of African-American social and civil liberty in the South.
The war on drugs, by raising the xed costs of drug-selling, may also have concentrated street vice
geographically. Our model provides some insight into the reasons why the quality of life may have
deteriorated in these neighborhoods.
9 The Location of Drug Users
Drug users have many of the same concerns as non-users with respect to their choices, but ad-
ditionally may seek to minimize costs of securing drugs. We assume that when choosing their
neighborhood, users do not know precisely where sellers will locate, but do know prices and the
distances between rms. The expected drug procurement costs conditional on locating in the city
is




since there is always at least one rm is located there. The cost of drug procurement in the suburb





4 ts if ns > 0
pc +  +
1
4 tc if ns = 0
As is the case with non-users, drug users choose locations to maximize (9). However their private
consumption x is y   c if they locate in the city and y   r   s if they locate in the suburb. Note
that if pc < ps and c < c, then it follows that c < s: Hence the e¤ective rent premium paid
by users to live in the suburb is greater than the rent premium paid by non-users. Additionally,
users have lower residual income to spend on (non-drug) consumption relative to non-users with
the same income. Both these e¤ects will induce some users to locate in the city even if non-users
with comparable incomes do not. This is stated more formally below.
An intraracially stratied allocation with user mobility is characterized by four thresholds:
~yb and ~yw for non-users, and ~ybd and ~ywd for drug users. An equilibrium is then a 5-tuple
(~yb; ~yw; ~ybd; ~ywd; r) satisfying
u(y) + vj(c; c)  u(y   r) + vj(s; s) (17)
15Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) nd a considerable national decline in segregation during this period (16.7
percent) but this decline is primarily outside the older industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest that Wilson is
most concerned with.
20
if and only if j = b and y  ~yb or j = w and y  ~yw for non-users, and
u(y   c) + vj(c; c)  u(y   r   s) + vj(s; s) (18)
if and only if j = b and y  ~ybd or j = w and y  ~ywd for users.
Let d denote the proportion of users in the metropolitan population, and di the proportion of
residents of neighborhood i 2 fc; sg who are users. Then the capacity constraint (11) becomes
(1  d) (Fb(~yb) + (1  )Fw(~yw)) + d (Fb(~ybd) + (1  )Fw(~ywd)) = c (19)
As before, if this is satised, then so is the capacity constraint for the suburb. The proportion of
residents who are users in city and suburb are, respectively,
dc =




d ( (1  Fb(~ybd)) + (1  ) (1  Fw(~ywd)))
s
The following result shows that drug users remain in the city at higher incomes than non-users in
the same social group, and that per-capita drug demand is therefore higher in the city.
Proposition 5. Suppose that pc < ps and c < c: Then, at any equilibrium with r > 0; we have
~yjd > ~yj for each j 2 fb; wg; and hence dc > ds:
Drug users are disproportionately located in the city (relative to non-users with comparable
income) for two reasons. First, this lowers their costs of drug procurement, since c < s: Second,
since users spend money on drugs they have less to spend on other consumption, lowering their
marginal bid rent to live in the suburb. They are e¤ectively less a­ uent than their income suggests.
These two e¤ects imply that dc > ds (the proportion of users per unit population will be greater in
the city than the suburb). Since population density is itself greater in the city, this implies greater
demand density per unit distance in the city relative to the suburb. The qualitative analysis in
Section 5-6 therefore remains intact. Greater drug demand per unit distance in the city further
strengths its comparative advantage relative to the suburb and makes complete specialization more
likely.
As long as the proportion d of users in the overall population is su¢ ciently small, any equilibrium
of the general model with sorting by users and non-users will be close to an equilibrium with only
non-user sorting in the following sense: the thresholds ~yb and ~yw under full sorting will approach the
corresponding thresholds under non-user sorting as d approaches zero. This means that the racial
disparities identied in Proposition 4 hold also in the more general case of full sorting as long as
the user population is small. Furthermore, these disparities arise among both users and nonusers:
the threshold at which white users move to the suburbs is lower than that at which black users
move. The result is segregation (in excess of that which would arise under pure income sorting) in
both user and non-user populations.
The greater concentration of users in the city has the e¤ect of further increasing seller density
there. This makes the city more attractive to drug users and less attractive to non-users. The
former move in and the latter move out; concentration begets concentration. Non-users move to
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the suburbs either because the rent premium is lower or because the distance between drug rms
is higher (relative to the case when users are immobile). And those (users and non-users) who live
in the proximity of street vice are disproportionately black, not only because of racial inequality in
the distribution of income, but also because there is a range of middle income levels within which
blacks remain in the exposed population while whites locate elsewhere.
10 Empirical Implications
Since drug sale and consumption are illegal, they are not well reported. As a result there is little
reliable data on actual consumption and sale of drugs, especially on a ne geographical basis. We
do have information, however, about phenomena that are plausibly correlated with drug use and
sales, such as drug arrests, overdoses and emergency room incidents, and murders. Any presumed
correlation, of course, deserves to be treated with skepticism.
10.1 Arrests
The model implies that drug tra¢ cking arrests should be concentrated in black neighborhoods.
This is especially true in metropolitan areas where the agglomeration regime prevails and the
anonymous drug market has collapsed in the suburbs. Even when there is no trade, rms are closer
together in cities. This makes them easier for the police to nd, and one would expect arrests to
be concentrated where they are easier to make.
Notice that this implication is about where arrests are made, not who is arrested. The model
does imply that blacks are more likely to be arrested for drug tra¢ cking under most conditions, but
does not carry a strong implication for consumption arrests, since rates of drug consumption are
assumed to be the same across groups. The model implies that the concentration of drug arrests
in black neighborhoods should be at least as great as the concentration of drug arrests on black
persons in all metropolitan areas, and much greater in some.
The model also implies that drug selling is more concentrated in central cities when  (the cost
to someone of going from suburb to city to buy drugs) is smaller. Ceteris paribus, we should expect
that in metropolitan areas where the black population is more centralized or inhabits a relatively
larger area the proportion of drug arrests made in black neighborhoods will be higher.
Wages also matter. The greater the black-white wage gap in the legitimate market, the greater
the concentration of drug arrests in the black neighborhood. Of course, our model assumes just
one wage in each neighborhood and so does not encompass the actual distribution of wages. The
relevant di¤erence is between the wages that black and white drug dealers could earn. Thus
something like the di¤erence between high school drop-out wages would be a better measure than
the unconditional wage gap. The greater the racial gap in the wage for unskilled labor, the greater
the concentration of drug arrests in black neighborhoods.
10.2 Overdoses and Emergency room incidents
Arrests depend on police initiatives, and nothing guarantees that police everywhere will be equally
aggressive in enforcing drug laws. Overdoses and emergency room incidents, on the other hand,
are largely involuntary, given the volume of drug consumption. Therefore, a number of researchers
22
have used them as proxies for drug consumption (see, for instance, Mocan and Corman, 2000). For
our purposes they have the added advantage of being localized: a person su¤ering an overdose or
other medical emergency is highly likely to be brought to the nearest emergency room.
On the other hand, overdoses and emergency room incidents are indicators of consumption,
not sale, unless people consume drugs close to where they purchase them. This would reduce the
concentration of these incidents. But increasing returns to scale and specialization play important
roles in the delivery of emergency medical services, quite apart from the organization of the drug
market. This would increase concentration.
If these centripetal and centrifugal forces are randomly present in metropolitan areas, then
metropolitan areas with more centralized black populations, larger black neighborhoods, and a
larger racial wage gap for unskilled men should also see a greater concentration of overdoses and
emergency room incidents.
10.3 Murders
People in the drug-selling business are much more likely to kill and be killed than people in most
other businesses. Legal means of dispute resolution are not available to the drug business and so
violence is often used to settle disputes; the threat of violence is used to deter attacks and disputes.
Criminal penalties for murder are also lower: the marginal cost of a conviction for murder is less
for somebody who faces a high probability of a 20-year sentence for drug tra¢ cking than it is for
someone with no other prospect of legal trouble. Judges and prosecutors may also tend to be less
harsh in sentencing people who have murdered drug dealers, than in sentencing those whose victims
are more sympathetic. Thus places with more drug-dealing should be places with more murder.
Thus, the fact that murders are concentrated in black neighborhoods is consistent with this
papers model. In New Jersey, for instance, eleven older, heavily black municipalities in 2003
accounted for 14.5% of the states population but 61.8% of its murders (New Jersey State Police,
2004). In New York, the 31 NYPD precincts located in community districts that were either
majority black, majority Hispanic or more than 75% black and Hispanic saw 49.8% of all murders
in the state in 2001. These community districts accounted for 17.2% of the states total population.
If we look only at community districts that are majority African-American, which comprised 7.5%
of state population, we nd that the precincts in these community districts reported 24.5% of the
states murders.
Hence we should expect to nd greater concentrations of murder in metropolitan areas with
more centralized black populations, large areas of black neighborhoods, and greater inter-racial
wage gaps.
11 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model that predicts that drug-selling will be concentrated in black
neighborhoods of central cities. This e¤ect arises through the interacting location choices of sellers
and (user and non-user) households. Areas with greater population density tend to have more
densely packed sellers and lower prices, which causes some non-users to depart selectively. As the
wealthier households leave, the remaining population becomes disproportionately black (due to
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racial inequality in the metropolitan income distribution). This induces lower income whites to
leave, heightening segregation. Users move in (although white and black users do so at di¤erent
rates), which further increases demand density and hence seller density. These e¤ects are mutu-
ally reinforcing, resulting in a centralized area with large concentrations of sellers, users, black
households of varying income levels, and the lowest income whites. Somewhat paradoxically, the
movement of black households to less exposed locations can result in an increase in overall black
exposure. This possibility arises because greater integration widens income and wage disparities
between city and suburb, inducing suburban sellers to move to the city, where a disproportionate
share of the black population resides.
The model relies on minimal assumptions about how black households di¤er from white house-
holds. Demand density is assumed to be independent of income and race, and preferences over
neighborhood racial composition may be consistent with strong tastes for diversity in both groups.
The only substantive di¤erence between blacks and whites lies in the distribution of income. Nev-
ertheless, the model generates a number of important implications for racial di¤erences in location,
occupation, arrest and incarceration. These results arise not from the pharmacological properties
of illicit drugs, except for inelastic demand, but from the fact that they are illegal. Thus they
probably apply to other kinds of anonymous vice such as gambling and prostitution. The legaliza-
tion of such activities would undoubtedly a¤ect their distribution across space, the consequences
of exposure to them, and the disparities in such exposure across income and identity groups.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The suburban consumers for whom drugs are most expensive under












under autarky. Hence, using (7), the autarky equilibrium will be replicated provided that










Next consider values of  below h, and suppose that prices and seller density in the city remain
at autarky levels, while suburban prices and seller density satisfy
ps = aut   1
2
ts; (22)
where aut is given by (7). In this case the marginal consumer is indi¤erent among the two adjacent
suburban rms and journeying to the city. The zero prot condition for suburban rms is
(ps   ws) ss   C = 0: (23)





aut + ws +
p







aut   ws  
p
(aut   ws)2   2Ast2

; (25)
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium of this type to exist is that the expression
under the square root be non-negative. This simplies to aut  ws + t
p
2As or, using (7),






Ac   l (26)
It is easily seen that  l < h since
p
2 < 32 :
If  <  l; suburban drug markets are no longer sustainable and all consumers, regardless of





to zero; and the quantity of drugs sold in the suburb drops from Lss to zero. The response in the
city is a discontinuous increase in demand density from c to










and note that A0c < Ac: Using the same reasoning as in the derivation of (3-5), we obtain the
following values for the price, number of rms, and inter-rm distance at this equilibrium:










Since A0c < Ac; the city has lower prices and greater seller density relative to autarky.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the latter (agglomeration) equilibrium also exists
for all  2 ( l; m) for some m >  l. Dene











agg + ws +
q







agg   ws  
q
(agg   ws)2   2Ast2

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It is easily seen that m >  l since A0c < Ac:
Proof of Proposition 3. First we prove that r 6= 0 in equilibrium. If r = 0; then either all
individuals in any given group strictly prefer one neighborhood to the other (which violates the
capacity constraints), or
vb(c; c)  vb(s; s) = vw(c; c)  vw(s; s) = 0; (28)
which contradicts (10), unless c = s = : But if c = s =  then vj(c; c) < vj(s; s) for each
j 2 fb; wg; so (28) cannot hold. Hence r 6= 0 in equilibrium.
Next, we show that all equilibrium allocations are intraracially stratied. Consider any group
j which is present in both locations. Then there must be some income y such that
u(y) + vj(c; c) = u(y   r) + vj(s; s);
otherwise all members of group j would strictly prefer one neighborhood to the other. Concavity
of u then implies intraracial stratication. If r > 0 then those with incomes above the threshold
for the group to which they belong live in the suburb, and if r < 0 then those with incomes above
the threshold for the group to which they belong live in the city. Hence all equilibrium allocations
are intraracially stratied.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Consider any allocation (~yb; ~yw) 2 [y^b; y] [y; y^w]: Since c  s at all
such allocations, we have
vb(c; c)  vb(s; s)  vw(c; c)  vw(s; s) (29)
from (10). Hence
u(~yb)  u(~yb   rb (~yb))  u(~yw)  u(~yw   rw (~yw)): (30)
Since u is strictly concave and rw (~yw) > 0 from (16), this implies rb (~yb) < rw (~yw) whenever
~yb < ~yw; and hence for all (~yb; ~yw) 2 [y^b; y)  (y; y^w]: For the special case ~yb = ~yw = y; c < s
and hence (29) and (30) both hold with strict inequality, which again implies rb (~yb) < rw (~yw) :
Hence there can be no equilibrium at any allocation (~yb; ~yw) 2 [y^b; y] [y; y^w]; and therefore none
with c 2 [; c ] :
To prove that there exists an equilibrium with c > 

c ; let yb denote the upper bound of the
support of Fb(y) and dene yw as the unique value of ~yw that satises (11) when ~yb = yb: If rb (yb) 
rw (yw) then there exists an equilibrium with allocation (~yb; ~yw) = (yb; yw) and rent r = rw (yw) > 0:
At this equilibrium c > 

c and s = 0: On the other hand, if rb (yb) > rw (yw) then there must be
some allocation (~yb; ~yw) 2 (y; yb) (y^w; y) that satises (11) and such that rb (~yb) = rw (~yw) > 0:
This follows from the fact that rb (y) < rw (y) : Any such allocation (~yb; ~yw) is an equilibrium with
rent r = rb (~yb) = rw (~yw) > 0: Furthermore, since (~yb; ~yw) 2 (y; yb) (y^w; y); we have c > c :
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any equilibrium (~yb; ~yw; ~ybd; ~ywd; r) with r > 0: The indi¤erence
condition for the marginal user belonging to group j is then
u(~yjd   c) + vj(c; c) = u(~yjd   r   s) + vj(s; s):
Comparing this to the indi¤erence condition for the marginal non-user in group j;
u(~yj) + vj(c; c) = u(~yj   r) + vj(s; s);
we get
u(~yjd   c)  u(~yjd   r   s) = u(~yj)  u(~yj   r):
Since s > c > 0;
u(~yjd   c)  u(~yjd   r   c) < u(~yj)  u(~yj   r) (31)
Suppose ~yjd  ~yj : Then concavity of u implies
u(~yjd   c)  u(~yjd   r   c) > u(~yj)  u(~yj   r);
which contradicts (31). Hence ~yjd > ~yj for each j 2 fb; wg, which implies from (1920),
dc =
d (Fb(~ybd) + (1  )Fw(~ywd))
(1  d) (Fb(~yb) + (1  )Fw(~yw)) + d (Fb(~ybd) + (1  )Fw(~ywd))
>
d (Fb(~ybd) + (1  )Fw(~ywd))
(1  d) (Fb(~ybd) + (1  )Fw(~ywd)) + d (Fb(~ybd) + (1  )Fw(~ywd)) = d
so dc > d > ds.
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